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I. INTRODUCTION
The provision of contraceptive information, products, and services
to teenagers is the subject of an intense, growing controversy in the
United States. For more than a decade, the public policy of the United
States government has been to encourage sexually active teenagers to
use contraceptives by providing a substantial amount of public funds
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to facilitate access by all teenagers to contraceptive information, serv-
ices, and products.1 To promote the use of contraceptives by sexually
active teenagers, Congress has adopted a policy of confidentiality
whereby federally funded family planning clinics are supposed to en-
courage parental involvement, but which are required to guarantee
confidentiality to teenagers who receive contraceptive services and
products.2 This policy has provoked substantial controversy.3 An-
other alternative, a small-scale sex education grant scheme authorized
by Congress in 1981 to fund family planning programs designed to en-
courage teenagers to abstain from premarital sex, also has been very
controversial.4 More recently, the establishment in some public
schools of "School-Based Clinics" to facilitate access by sexually active
or potentially sexually active teenagers to contraceptives and contra-
ceptive services has generated further controversy.5 The AIDS crisis
appears to be the latest addition to the growing controversy about the
provision of contraceptive information, services, and products to teen-
1. Weed, Curbing Births, Not Pregnancies, Wall St. J., Oct. 14,1986, at 36, col. 4. ("In
1971 the annual national expenditure (federal, state and local money) for [family-
planning] clinics was $11 million, and 300,000 of their clients were teenagers. By
1981, the numbers were $442 million and 1.5 million clients."). See also Olsen &
Weed, Effects of Family-Planning Programs for Teenagers on Adolescent Birth
and Pregnancy Rates, 20 FAM. PERsP. 153, 154 (1986)(between 1969 and 1980 the
number of white teenagers receiving family planning services rose nearly 1,700
percent, and the number of black teenagers receiving family planning services
rose nearly 300 percent).
2. See infra Part V (discussing "squeal rule" cases).
3. See generally Bowen, Teenage Sexual Activity: Postponement as a Viable Alter-
native, J. FAM. & CULT., Autumn 1986, at 1; Dawson, The Effects of Sex Educa-
tion on Adolescent Behavior, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 162 (1986); Hofferth, Kahn &
Baldwin, Premarital Sexual Activity Among U.S. Teenage Women Over the Past
Three Decades, 19 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 46 (1987); Polit, White & Morton, Sex Edu-
cation and Family Planning Services for Adolescents in Foster Care, 19 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 18 (1987); Silverman, Torres & Forrest, Barriers to Contraceptive
Services, 19 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 94 (1987); Bennett, Why Johnny Can't Abstain,
Nat'l Rev., July 3,'1987, at 36; Bennett, Sex and the Education of Our Children,
America, Feb. 14,1987, at 120; Goldberg, Values are Key Factor in Teen-Age Preg-
nancy, Ed. Week, Jan 21, 1987, at 5.
4. The Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981)(codified at
42 U.S.C. § 300 (1982)). The constitutionality of this law was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in 1988. Bowen v. Kendrick, 108 S. Ct. 2562 (1988).
5. In 1988 it was reported that 138 school-based clinics were in operation in 30 states
and in the District of Columbia (up from 14 in 1985), and that at least 65 more
were being planned. Dryfoos, School-Based Clinics: Three Years of Experience,
20 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 193 (1985). See also Comment, The Dissemination of Fam-
ily Planning Services and Contraceptives in Public Schools, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 587,
588 (1987). See generally Glasow, School-Based Clinics Promote Abortion, in WIN-
DOW ON THE FUTURE 121 (D. Andrusko ed. 1987); Kenney, School-Based Clinics: A
National Report, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERsP. 44 (1986); Zabin, Hirsch, Smith, Streett &
Hardy, Evaluation of Pregnancy Prevention Program for Urban Teenagers, 18
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 119 (1986); Sex and Schools, TIME, Nov. 24, 1986, at 54; L.A.
Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at 118, col. 1; L.A. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at 122, col. 1.
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agers as debate over the promotion of condom use (by teens and
others) to prevent the spread of AIDS intensifies.
6
The policy differences among the various participants in the debate
about teenage access to contraceptives are clear. Both sides express
alarm at the high and increasing incidence of teen pregnancy in
America. Proponents of confidential teenager access to contraceptives
see sex education and use of contraceptives as the logical, necessary
remedies for the problem. Since parental notification or consent re-
quirements deter teenagers' use of contraceptives, 7 proponents oppose
mandatory parental involvement requirements. Opponents view the
liberal provision of contraceptives to minors as part of the cause of the
problem and decry the subversion of parental authority and family in-
tegrity that confidential teenager access to contraceptives seems to
entail.
Inevitably, the disputants have asserted their claims in court.8
Also inevitably, both sides claim that constitutional rights are in-
volved. The issue is of such personal and social importance, and feel-
ings about it are so strong that many people assume it must be a
constitutional question. Many parents believe that the provision of
contraceptive information, products, or services to their children in-
fringes upon their constitutionally guaranteed rights to raise their
children; yet many advocates of family planning programs argue that
the Constitution protects the right of minors to obtain contraceptives
confidentially without parental involvement.
A doctrine of constitutional law relates to the provision of contra-
ceptives to minors-the doctrine of "privacy." However, the privacy
decisions of the United States Supreme Court support certain claims
of both parents' rights and minors' rights; on the issue of contraceptive
6. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1988, at A35, col. 1; L.A. Times, Aug. 14, 1988, at 12L5, col. 4;
N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1988, at Al, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1988, at Al, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, Feb. 12, 1987, at Al, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1987, at C1, col. 1. See also
Pro-Condom Bias Cited as 3 Quit Sex Panel, L.A. Times, Mar. 3,1988, at A2, col. 5.
7. Nearly half of all the teenage contraceptive recipients reported that their parents
did not know that they were obtaining contraceptives, including more than one-
third of the girls age 15 or younger. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents:
Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family Planning and Abortion Services,
12 FAM. PLAN. PERsp. 284 (1980). Other studies have consistently confirmed that
approximately one-half of all teens who seek birth control services do not tell
their parents. See R. MNOOKIN, IN THE INTEREST OF CHILDREN 158 (1985)("over
one-half" got secret abortions); Rosen, Benson & Stack, Help or Hinderance" Pa-
rental Impact on Pregnant Teenagers' Resolution Decisions, 31 FAM. RE.. 271
(1982) (43 percent secret abortions). Nine out of 10 contraceptive providers do
not require parental notification before providing contraceptives to 17-year-olds,
and 80 percent of them do not even require parental notification if the teenage
recipient is 15 years old or younger. Torres, Forrest & Eisman, supra.
8. See generally H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 309
(2d ed. 1988). See also R. MNOOKIN, supra note 7 ("over one-half" get secret abor-
tions); Rosen, Benson & Stack, supra note 7.
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access for minors, those competing privacy claims unavoidably con-
flict. Moreover, while many commentators have read the privacy deci-
sions very broadly to define large, generic "zones" of privacy, and
while occasional dicta in some judicial opinions invite such broad in-
terpretation, the actual holdings of the Supreme Court, and most of
the decisions of the lower courts as well, have been relatively narrow.
To date, the debate about the respective rights and roles of parents
and children regarding the provision of contraceptives to minors has
evaded "constitutionalization."
This Article offers a framework for analyzing the extent to which
the policy dispute regarding the provision of contraceptives to minors
implicates the constitutional rights of parents and minors. Part II re-
views the conceptual context of the conflict between the legal rights of
parents and teenage minors. The cases supporting and arguments for
the parents' rights position are reviewed in Part III. In Part IV, the
cases supporting and arguments for the minors' rights position are re-
viewed. Recent decisions of the federal courts regarding the provision
of contraceptives to minors are examined in Part V. In Part VI, the
conceptual failings of privacy analysis to resolve the teenage-access-to-
contraceptives issues are examined and an alternative constitutional
analysis is proposed. The constitutional solution is systemic or proce-
dural; the Constitution affords a way to establish legislative policy, not
a substitute for it.
II. THE DILEMMA OF MINORITY IN LEGAL THEORY
Conceptually, the broad "dilemma of minority" which lies at the
heart of the controversy concerning the provision of contraceptives to
minors results from two factors. The first is a biological fact: All chil-
dren are born totally dependent and incompetent. They are incapable
of providing for themselves or of making responsible decisions for
many years. Over a period of time, however, they gradually become
independent and competent. By the time they have reached legal
"majority" (twenty-one years after birth at common law, and eighteen
years in most states today), most persons have become about as in-
dependent and rational as they are going to become. But the process
of maturation is very individualized-some persons achieve general in-
dependence and judgmental maturity while they are young adoles-
cents, while other persons remain dependent and show immature
judgment long after they legally become adults.
The other factor contributing to the dilemma of minority is that
our legal system is predicated on individual independence and compe-
tence as the moral basis for personal liberty and accountability. The
classic explanation of this premise was made by John Stewart Mill in
1989]
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his treatise, On Liberty.9 After describing his general principle of
"Liberty",10 Mill then qualified it by excluding minors:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply
only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties. We are not speaking
of children, or of young persons below the age which the law may fix as that of
manhood or womanhood. Those who are still in a state to require being taken
care of by others, must be protected against their own actions as well as
against external injury.... Liberty, as a principle, has no application to any
state of things anterior to the time when mankind have become capable of
being improved by free and equal discussion.1 1
Twenty years earlier, Jeremy Benthan had stated essentially the same
thing:
The feebleness of infancy demands a continual protection. Everything
must be done for an imperfect being, which as yet does nothing for itself. The
complete development of its physical power takes many years; that of its intel-
lectual faculties is still slower. At a certain age, it has already strength and
passions, without experience enough to regulate them. Too sensitive to pres-
ent impulses, too negligent of the future, such a being must be kept under an
authority more immediate than that of the laws .... 
1 2
Even earlier, in his summary of the common law of England, Black-
stone endorsed essentially the same principle as "a principle of natural
law" imposed by nature itself.13
Thus, while children are "persons" in the eyes of the law from the
moment of birth, their parents are considered to be their natural legal
guardians, and Anglo-American law traditionally has adhered to a
nearly irrebuttable presumption that parents have the legal right and
duty to act for their children. The exceptions which have generally
been recognized traditionally are specific and narrow. These excep-
tions include: (1) "emergencies"-when waiting for parental consent
would cause immediate and irreparable harm to the child; (2) "eman-
cipation"-when the parent and the child mutually agree by their ac-
tions that the child is no longer in need of parental support or
direction; or (3) "extraordinary public policy"-when the requirement
of parental consent might thwart a strong public policy (usually a
health policy) designed to foster the best interests of children.14
9. J. MILL, On Liberty, in ESSENTIAL WORKS OF JOHN STUART MILL 263 (1961).
10. "That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
Id.
11. Id.
12. 1 J. BENTHAN, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 248 (Boston 1840), quoted in Wald, Chil-
dren's Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 256 n.4
(1979).
13. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND* 447.
14. In recent years, the number of these "extraordinary public policies" has multi-
plied, and today there are numerous statutes authorizing specific exceptions to
the general rule of parental guardianship (e.g., for drug treatment, pregnancy
treatment, venereal disease treatment, abortion, and contraception use). See gen-
erally Brinig, Noneconomic Consequences of the Parent-Child Relationship, in II
[-Vol. 68:216
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Thus, the transition from dependence and incompetence to individ-
ual independence and competence creates the dilemma of minority
and minors' rights and the law. Though the transition is a complex,
highly individualized process, the law has created only two categories
to deal with it: incompetence (minority) and competence (majority).
Of course, the law could deal with the highly variable and individual-
ized nature of the transition from incompetence to competence on a
case-by-case basis.15 But this approach presents four problems. First,
no clear consensus has established a standard or definition for deter-
mining maturity or legal competence.16 Second, even if an accepted
standard or definition of maturity existed, no test is generally recog-
nized for measuring maturity. Third, no consensus exists to solve the
problem of who should decide the question. Families are obviously in
the best position, but it is against families that the individual minors
are asserting the claim of maturity and independence. Finally, the ex-
pense and burden that would be involved if a public agency were to
make such a determination would render such an individualized pro-
cess impractical, if not financially impossible, or at least would guaran-
tee that it would be merely a token bureaucratic exercise.' 7 Thus, the
law has historically taken a categorical approach-setting a specific
age and following the general presumption that before that age all mi-
nors are incompetent, while after that age they are competent. Such
age distinctions, however, are unavoidably arbitrary.'8 As Lord Den-
ning once observed: "[Tihe legal right of a parent to the custody of a
child... is a dwindling right which the courts will hesitate to enforce
against the wishes of the child, the older he is. It starts with a right of
CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW § 15.01 (L. Wardle, C. Blakesley & J. Parker eds.
1988); Dodson, Legal Rights of Adolescents: Restrictions on Liberty, Emancipa-
tion, and Status Offenses, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 114 (R. Horowitz & H.
Davidson ed. 1984).
15. For a discussion of the problems of indeterminacy in this and similar contexts,
see Mnookin, Child Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterni-
nacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975); Wald, supra note 12, at 268 n.55.
16. As Justice Powell noted:
[The] problem of determining 'maturity' makes clear why the State gen-
erally may resort to objective, though inevitably arbitrary, criteria such
as age limits ... for lifting some or all of the legal disabilities of minority.
Not only is it difficult to define, let alone determine, maturity, but the
fact that a minor may be very much of an adult in some respects does not
mean that his or her need and opportunity for growth under parental
guidance and discipline have ended.
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 n.23 (1979)(Powell, J., plurality opinion). The
tremendous changes that have occurred in recent years in the field of mental
health law further attest to the confusion that exists regarding the proper stan-
dard for measuring maturity and competence.
17. For comparison see Mnookin, Bellotti v. Baird. A Hard Case, in IN THE INTEREST
OF CHILDREN 149, 237-40 (R. Mnookin ed. 1985)(reporting how the judicial con-
sent for abortion law of Massachusetts is applied as a "rubber stamp" by judges).
18. Dodson, supra note 14, at 117; Wald, supra note 12, at 267.
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control and ends with little more than [a right to give] advice."' 9
Thus, the legal role and status of children and families in society
raise extremely perplexing questions. The claim that minors have a
right to obtain and use contraceptives without parental knowledge or
direction challenges some fundamental premises of our legal system.
"Most legal and social policy is based on the beliefs that children lack
the capacity to make decisions on their own and that parental control
of children is needed to support a stable family system, which is cru-
cial to the well-being of society."
20
Not surprisingly, no consistent, coherent legal theory has provided
a framework of understanding for the rights of minors in transition
between dependent childhood and independent adulthood.21 When
courts are forced to address questions involving claims of legal rights
of minors, they respond by applying "largely ad hoc analysis." 22
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PARENTS
A. Parents' Rights in General
It would have been impossible to speak of the "constitutional
rights" of parents to direct the upbringing and raising of their children
prior to the twentieth century. The concept of the parent-child rela-
tionship was not generally perceived in legal terms until late in the
nineteenth century, and the notion that the parent-child relationship
involves constitutional rights is of an even more recent ideological
evolution.23 At the time the Constitution was drafted, and during
most of the time since then, a different theory of "rights" prevailed.24
This is not to say, however, that parent-child relations were with-
out constitutional significance until this century. Though the Consti-
tution of the United States does not explicitly mention parents' rights,
19. Hewer v. Bryant, 3 All E.R. 578, 582 (1969).
20. Wald, supra note 12, at 259 (footnotes omitted).
21. See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 14, at 116; Wald, supra note 12, at 258; Note, Minors'
Right of Privacy, 8 J. Juv. L. 170, 173 (1984).
22. Note, The Right of Minors to Confidential Access to Contraceptives, 47 ALB. L.
REV. 214, 216 (1982).
23. See generally Horowitz, Children's Rights: A Look Backward and A Glance
Ahead, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 1, 3-4 (R. Horowitz & H. Davidson ed.
1984); infra note 66 and accompanying text.
24. For instance, de Montesquieu emphasized the distinction between "manners" or
"customs" on the one hand and "laws" on the other, and emphasized that matters
of custom and manner were inappropriate subjects for legal regulation. II C. DE
SECONDAT (BARON DE MONTESQUIEU), THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 23:14 (T. Nugent
transl. 1873). de Montesquieu was the most influential, most frequently quoted
non-biblical writer in America during the period of 1760-1805, particularly during
the decade of 1780 when the Constitution was being drafted and debated. Lutz,
The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century Ameri-
can Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. SC. REV. 189-97 (1984).
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PARENTS' VS. MINORS' RIGHTS
the "domestic habits" .of the American people, including the tradition
of parental authority and family integrity, were considered by the
drafters of the Constitution necessary "preconditions" for maintaining
the constitutional republic. The founders were convinced that public
virtue was an essential prerequisite for a successful democratic gov-
ernment and that virtue was to be generated, nurtured, and fostered
first in the homes of America.25 Alexis de Tocqueville emphasized
that "the American derives from his own home that love of order
which he afterward carries with him into public affairs."26 His con-
temporary, Francis Grund, likewise emphasized the political signifi-
cance of the domestic habits in America.
I consider the domestic virtue of the Americans as the principal source of
all their other qualities.... No government could be established on the same
principle as that of the United States with a different code of morals. The
American Constitution is remarkable for its simplicity; but it can only suffice
a people habitually correct in their actions, and would be utterly inadequate to
the wants of a different nation. Change the domestic habits of the Americans,
their religious devotion, and their high respect for morality, and it will not be
necessary to change a single letter in the Constitution in order to vary the
whole form of their government.
2 7
Thus, the Supreme Court in modern times has noted that "the Consti-
tution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institu-
tion of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down
many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural." 28
The Supreme Court has long recognized that parents are entitled
to very broad latitude in raising their children. More than sixty years
ago, the Supreme Court of the United States in Meyer v. Nebraska29
held that the authority of parents to rear their children free of coer-
cive state supervision is one of the unwritten "liberties" protected by
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. In 1919, the Ne-
25. See generally R. VETTERLI & G. BRYNER, IN SEARCH OF THE REPUBLIC, PUBLIC
VIRTUE AND THE RoOTs OF AMERICAN GOVERNIMENT (1987).
26. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 304 (F. Bowen trans. 2d ed. 1945).
See also 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 210, 211 (F. Bowen trans.
2d ed. 1945).
27. F. GRUND, ARISTOCRACY IN AMERICA 212-13 (rev. ed. 1959).
28. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977). See Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (Marriage creates "the most important relation in life,....
having more to do with the morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution.") Gaines v. Relf, 53 U.S. 472, 534 (1851) ("The great basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is founded on marriages. . . ."); Sexton v.
Wheaton, 21 U.S. 229, 239 (1823)("IT]he sweetness of social intercourse, the har-
mony of society, the happiness of families, depend on that mutual partiality
which they feel, or that delicate forbearance which they manifest towards each
other."). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223 (1972); Andrews v. An-
drews, 188 U.S. 14, 30 (1903); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 45 (1885); Connecti-
cut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U.S. 457, 461 (1876).
29. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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braska Legislature enacted a law prohibiting any person from teach-
ing subjects in any language other than English or from teaching any
modern language other than English to students who had not passed
the eighth grade. Meyer, a teacher in a school run by the Zion Evan-
gelical Lutheran Congregation, was convicted of violating the law by
teaching German (using Bible stories) to a ten-year-old boy who had
not passed the eighth grade.30
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The
opinion of the Court did not emphasize the rights that Meyer had as a
teacher or private citizen to teach German. It instead focused on the
rights of the parents to direct the education of their children and the
protection Meyer enjoyed because he was acting as the agent of the
parents. Justice McReynolds, writing for the Court, declared that
"[w]ithout doubt" among the undefined liberties protected by the
fourteenth amendment are the rights "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children."31 Corresponding to this right of control, "it is the
natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to
their station in life." 32 While Plato and others throughout history
have advocated that the state rather than the parents should assume
the responsibility of raising children, the Court concluded: "Although
such measures have been deliberately approved by men of great ge-
nius their ideas touching the relation between individual and State
were wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest"
and it could not be doubted "that any Legislature could impose such
restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both
letter and spirit of the Constitution."33
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,34 the Supreme
Court again underscored constitutional protection for parental rights
when it affirmed the unconstitutionality of an Oregon law which re-
quired parents to send children between the ages of eight and sixteen
to public school for instruction. A private military academy and a reli-
gious order which operated an orphanage and private school success-
fully challenged the law in federal court. Justice McReynolds, again
writing for the Court, reemphasized the rights of parents as he vindi-
cated the position of the private schools.
[W]e think it entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of
children under their control.... The fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the
state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
30. Today the fact that he taught from the Bible would be more disturbing to some.
31. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
32. l at 400.
33. Id. at 402.
34. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.35
The next major case was decided in 1944. In Prince v. Massachu-
sett,S3 6 the Court extended great rhetorical respect for parental pre-
rogatives in child rearing, but upheld the conviction under
Massachussets child labor laws of a woman who allowed her nine-
year-old niece to join her in selling religious tracts on public side-
walks. Justice Rutlege, writing for the Court, emphasized family pri-
vacy, stating:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first
in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder....
And it is in recognition of this that [Meyer and Pierce] have respected the
private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.
3 7
"However," the Court added, "the family itself is not beyond regula-
tion in the public interest."3 8 Finding substantial risks of physical and
other harm to children from selling religious tracts on busy public
streets, the Court upheld the conviction.
In 1972 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle of parental
freedom from state compulsion when it decided matters involving the
education and religion of older adolescents in Wisconsin v. Yoder.39
Three Amish parents who refused to send their fourteen- and fifteen-
year-old children to school after they graduated from the eighth grade
were convicted of violating Wisconsin's compulsory education law,
which required parents to keep children in school until the age of six-
teen. Attendance at high school was contrary to Amish beliefs and to
the Amish way of life. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the
convictions, holding that they violated the first amendment's guaran-
tee of freedom of religion.
The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed that the convictions were inva-
lid, emphasizing parents' rights as well as freedom of religion. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court, explained:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility
for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control
and duration of basic education.... [Likewise,] the values of parental direction
of the religious upbringing and education of their children in their early and
formative years have a high place in our society.... Thus, a State's interest in
universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a bal-
ancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as
... the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing
of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, "prepare [them] for
35. Id. at 534-35.
36. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
37. Id. at 166.
38. Id.
39. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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additional obligations."
4 0
The Court found that the effect of two additional years of
mandatory schooling would contravene the freedom of religion of both
the Amish parents and their children "by exposing Amish children to
worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to
beliefs.... at the crucial adolescent stage of development."41 After
finding that the Amish were remarkably self-reliant, industrious, good
citizens and that the effect of one or two additional years of education
would not substantially further any legitimate state interest, the
Court returned to parental prerogatives.
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children.
The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This pri-
mary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established
beyond debate as an enduring American tradition....
To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential
for significant social burdens. But in this case [they do not].
4 2
Likewise, in Moore v. City of East C7eveland,43 the Supreme Court
held that zoning laws could not be written or applied in a way that
prevented children and grandchildren from residing in the home of
their mother and grandmother. The Court reversed the conviction of
a woman for violating the housing ordinance of the City of East Cleve-
land. Writing for a plurality, Justice Powell stated:
A host of cases ... have consistently acknowledged a "private realm of family
life which the state cannot enter." . . . Of course, the family is not beyond
regulation .... But when the government intrudes on choices concerning fam-
ily living arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of
the governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served
by the challenged regulation.
4 4
The Supreme Court also has held that states may not deprive par-
ents of their parental rights in judicial proceedings without observing
substantial procedural protections. These include adherence to the
"clear and convincing" standard of proof to terminate parental
rights,45 providing a hearing before terminating the rights of a father
who had lived with and raised his illegitimate child,4S and substantial
jurisdictional basis for exercising custody jurisdiction. 47
40. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925)).
41. Id. at 218.
42. Id. at 232, 233-34.
43. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
44. Id. at 499 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
45. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
46. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246 (1978).
47. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
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B. Parents' Rights vs. Minors' Rights in General
The foregoing cases declared and protected the fundamental right
of parents to make certain child-rearing decisions free from state re-
striction. However, each case only involved a parent versus state con-
flict. These cases could be read as establishing limits to governmental
authority as readily as they could be read as constitutionally establish-
ing the "rights" of parents generally. And while they can be read as
supporting parents' rights over the rights of their minor children,48
these cases did not involve, nor did the Court decide, a parent versus
child conflict.
Very few cases have come before the United States Supreme Court
involving direct conflicts between the rights of parents to raise their
children and the rights of children to be free of parental control. As a
general rule, however, the Court has recognized parental authority
even when it conflicts with the opposing desires of the children. For
instance, in Ginsberg v. New York,49 the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of a magazine seller for violating a state statute prohibiting
the sale of "girlie" magazines to minors under seventeen years of age,
even though the magazines were not technically obscene and adults
could buy them. While the legal dispute was between the police and a
seller of sexually explicit magazines, obviously the minor purchasers
wanted to buy the magazines without parental permission and pre-
sumably the parents were opposed. (If not, they could have purchased
the magazine for their son.) The Court suggested the state could ban
the sale because the state was, in a sense, acting as the agent of
parents.
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that parents' claim
to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is
basic in the structure of our society.... The legislature could properly con-
clude that parents and others . . .who have this primary responsibility for
children's well-being are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid dis-
charge of that responsibility.
5 0
The Court also acknowledged that adequate parental supervision can-
not always be provided and that "[t]he state also has an independent
interest in the well-being of its youth."51
Four years later, when the issue of the separate wishes of minors
48. The potential for conflict between parents and children has been present in most
parents' rights cases. That is, the children in Meyer may not have wanted to learn
German, the children in Pierce may not have wanted to attend public schools, and
so forth. The fact that for half a century the Court never addressed the potential
conflict underscores the pervasiveness of the assumption of parental preroga-
tives. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
49. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
50. Id. at 639.
51. Id. at 640.
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was raised in Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 2 the Court brushed it aside as in-
consequential. Justice Douglas, in a separate opinion, dissenting in
part, argued that if the Amish youngsters wanted to go to school be-
yond the eighth grade and their parents were keeping them home
against their will, the parents could be convicted of violating the com-
pulsory school attendance law. While the majority did not think it
necessary to decide that question, the Court clearly expressed its un-
willingness to endorse the idea that children could be freed from pa-
rental direction in matters of education or religion.
Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible com-
peting interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state
court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that
Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high
school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the
claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question
traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and edu-
cation of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions. It is
clear that suth an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of
religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom com-
parable to those raised here and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters
.... 53
In 1979 the Supreme Court directly considered and unequivocally
decided a case involving a clear conflict of parents' and minors' choices
when it reversed a federal district court ruling that parents could not
commit their children to state mental health facilities for treatment
without an adversarial hearing before a formal tribunal. In Parham v.
J.R,54 the Court held that ordinary commitment procedures in which
a doctor must approve the parental decision to commit the child are
constitutionally sufficient. The Court underscored the general prior-
ity of parents' rights when it acknowledged that some minors may ob-
ject to being committed by their parents for mental treatment and
further admitted that such commitment could detrimentally stigma-
tize the children. Yet the Court affirmed parental rights in this clear
and unavoidable clash of potential interests. Chief Justice Burger's
opinion explained the Court's reasoning:
Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our
cases have consistently followed that course .... Surely, this includes a "high
duty" to recognize symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical advice.
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess
what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required
for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recog-
nized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children....
That some parents "may at times be acting against the interests of their
52. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
53. Id. at 231-32.
54. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
[Vol. 68:216
PARENTS' VS. MINORS' RIGHTS
children" . . . creates a basis for caution, but is hardly a reason to discard
wholesale those pages of human experience that teach that parents generally
do act in the child's best interests. The statist notion that governmental power
should supersede parental authority in all cases because some parents abuse
and neglect children is repugnant to American tradition.
5 5
Addressing the argument that the earlier Supreme Court parents'
rights decisions had involved state-parent conflicts only and not par-
ent-child conflicts, the Parham court declared:
We cannot assume that the result in Meyer v. Nebraska, and Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, would have been any different if the children there had announced
a preference to learn only English or a preference to go to a public, rather
than a church, school. The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or
complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not dimin-
ish the parents' authority to decide what is best for the child.
5 6
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion summarized the basic rule suc-
cinctly: "For centuries it has been a canon of the common law that
parents speak for their minor children. So deeply imbedded in our
traditions is this principle of law that the Constitution itself may com-
pel a State to respect it."57
Parental authority over minor children is not absolute, however. It
is clear that children enjoy some substantive rights or interests which
they may assert against their parents and over parental objection.
Categorically the right or interest which children may assert against
their parents is freedom from substantial and immediate risk to their
lives or health.
In Prince v. Massachusetts58 the Court explained: "It is [in] the
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens."s 9 The Court
went on to say: "Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves.
But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to
make martyrs of their children before they have reached the age of
full and legal discretion when they can make that choice for
themselves."6 0
Subsequently, in Wisconsin v. Yoder~l the Court declared: "To be
sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise
claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that pa-
rental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
have a potential for significant social burdens."6 2 In Parham v. J ._
55. Id. at 602-03.
56. Id. at 603-04.
57. Id. at 621 (footnotes omitted).
58. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
59. Id. at 165.
60. Id. at 170.
61. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
62. Id. at 233-34. (Might not some people view parental refusal to allow a sexually
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the Supreme Court noted that past decisions had frequently "recog-
nized that a state is not without constitutional control over parental
discretion in dealing with children when their physical or mental
health is jeopardized."6
3
Thus, minors do have a right to life and health which may be as-
serted by or for them against and over the opposition of their parents.
But presumably the state could act to protect the life or health of a
minor even if both she and her parents objected. These Supreme
Court cases do not confer on minors a general right to choose (i.e.,
exercise judgment, preference, or free will) to behave contrary to pa-
rental supervision. Rather, they protect the minors' potential to be-
come independent, mature, and competent enough to exercise
judgment, choice, preference, and free will.
The only other significant limitation on the constitutional rights of
parents to supervise their minor children has been in abortion cases.
While conceptually these cases could provide the foundation for far-
reaching reformulation of the balance between parents' and minors'
constitutional rights because they involve the potentially expansive
right of privacy, the Supreme Court has deliberately narrowed the
holdings, treating the abortion decision as a unique exception to the
general rule of parental authority.64
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF MINORS
A. Minors' Rights in General
The notion that minors have constitutional rights is of even more
recent vintage than the concept that parents have constitutional
rights. "The idea of children having rights is, in many ways, a revolu-
tionary one."65 Not until this century could it accurately be stated
that children had personal legal rights, much less constitutional
rights. Previously, they had been entitled to special state "protec-
tions" instead of "rights."66
During the late 1960s and early 1970s the United States underwent
a great movement to ease the restrictions upon, and increase the legal
rights of, young Americans. Many young men were being drafted to
fight in Vietnam and sentiment was widespread to extend to them and
active teenager to be provided with condoms or other contraceptives to "have a
potential for significant social burdens"?)
63. 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)(citation omitted).
64. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
65. Wald, supra note 12, at 256. "The demand for children's rights calls into question
basic beliefs of our society. Implementation of many of the rights being claimed
for children could involve substantially altering the role of the state toward par-
ents and children and the role of parents toward children." Id. at 259 (footnote
omitted).
66. Wald, supra note 12, at 256, 260; Horowitz, supra note 23, at 2.
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their peers the full privileges, as well as the burdens, of citizenship.67
At the same time, concern was growing over equality of women under
the law. As a result, many restrictions upon minors, which tradition-
ally had extended until age twenty-one for men, and in some states
also for women, were altered.68 The modern era in which the
Supreme Court has applied "constitutional rights" analysis to minors
is generally said to have begun with the 1967 decision of the Supreme
Court in In re Gault.69 And it was not until 1969 that the Supreme
Court definitively declared that children (students) "are 'persons'
under our Constitution. They are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect." 70
Nevertheless, whether conceptualized as "special protections or
benefits" or "individual rights," American law has long recognized the
"personhood" of minors, even if not in the full sense of being the sub-
ject of all the legal rights and duties of competent adults.7 1 Three sep-
arate categories of cases have addressed the subject of the
"personhood" or "rights" of minors.
The first, and oldest, category of cases are those dealing with state
discrimination against "illegitimate" children. The United States
Supreme Court historically was more humane in protecting children
born out of wedlock than was the common law.72 The modern period
which recognized the legal personhood of children born out of wed-
lock began in 1968 when the Court decided Levy v. Louisiana,73 and
its companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insur-
ance Co.74 In Levy Justice Douglas declared: "We start from the
premise that illegitimate children are not 'nonpersons.' They are
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly 'persons' within
67. For instance, the twenty-sixth amendment, which extended the right to vote to
all persons age 18 and older, was submitted to the states for ratification in March
1971 and was ratified three months later by three-fourths of the states. G. GUN-
THER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW A-14 (11th ed. 1986).
68. See generally Horowitz, supra note 23, at 2-4; Wardle, Rethinking Marital Age
Restrictions, 22 J. FAM. L. 1 (1983).
69. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See generally Horowitz, supra note 23, at 2-4.
70. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
71. Justice Douglas suggested that the term "person" includes all individuals who
"are humans, live, and have their being." Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968)
(speaking of illegitimate children). Justice Blackmun, who rejected the per-
sonhood of the unborn generally, Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 158, 162 (1973), has
emphasized that minors who do not enjoy full legal rights are persons and may
claim certain fundamental constitutional rights. Planned Parenthood v. Dan-
forth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976). See infra notes 71, 102-06 and accompanying text.
72. DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891);
Gaines v. Hennen, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 553 (1860); Brewer's Lessee v. Blougher, 39
U.S. (14 Pet.) 178 (1840); Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivant, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 207
(1820).
73. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
74. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." 75 Since then the Court frequently has wrestled with
the question of the constitutionality of laws providing disparate treat-
ment for children born out of wedlock or for their parents.76
The second category of cases involves school rules and disciplinary
proceedings. For instance, in West Virginia State Board of Education
v. Barnette,7 7 the Court invalidated a state statute which required all
school children to salute the flag. The statute was challenged by Jeho-
vah's Witnesses whose church doctrine holds flag saluting as idola-
trous and violative of one of the Ten Commandments. The Court
concluded: "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling
the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on
their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which is the
purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control."78 A decade later Brown v. Board of Education79
established black children's rights to be free from racial discrimina-
tion in public educational opportunities. Likewise, in Tinker v. Des
Moines School District,8 0 the Court found that the first amendment
rights of three public school students had been violated when they
were summarily suspended for wearing black armbands to school to
protest the Vietnam war. The Court declared: "In the absence of a
specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons to regulate their
speech, students are entitled to freedom of expression of their
views."8 1 In Goss v. Lopez,8 2 the Court held that students facing sus-
pension from a state-run school are entitled to certain procedural pro-
tections such as prior notice and an opportunity for a hearing.
The third category of cases holds that children are entitled to basic
procedural protections against deprivations of their life, liberty, and
property by judicial or quasi-judicial state tribunals. "[Tihere is noth-
75. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70 (1968).
76. See, e.g., Clark v. Jetter, 108 S. Ct. 1910 (1988); Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1 (1983);
Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979);
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews
v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New
Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S.
535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Lebine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
77. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
78. Id. at 642. Note, however, that in this case the Court did not specify whose
"sphere of intellect and spirit" was protected by the first amendment. Because
minor students were the direct objects of the flag salute law, it is obvious to as-
sume that they were the persons the Court had in mind. But it is also possible
that the Court was thinking of the parents and their liberty to raise their children
and control their religious observances.
79. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
80. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
81. Id. at 511.
82. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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ing about juvenile or minority status... that justifies a... failure to
provide the most basic protective safeguards inherent in procedural
due process."8 3 Thus, in 1967 the Supreme Court held in In re Gault84
that minors may not be deprived of basic procedural protections in
juvenile court proceedings. Three years later, in In re Winship,85 the
Court held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally
required at the adjudicatory stage of delinquency proceedings. In
Breed v. Jones,86 the Supreme Court held that it would violate the
double jeopardy provision of the Constitution to transfer a child to a
criminal court for prosecution after a juvenile court adjudicatory
hearing.87
However, minors do not always enjoy the same procedural or sub-
stantive rights as adults. For instance, in Ingraham v. Wright 8 the
Court held that common law restraints upon the infliction of "moder-
ate correction" by means of corporal punishment in school are suffi-
cient and more formal procedural protections such as notice and prior
hearing are not necessary.8 9 In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,90 the Court held
that under the less rigorous standards in juvenile court delinquency
proceedings, the probable cause requirements of the fourth amend-
ment do not require exclusion of evidence taken by a school official
from a student's purse.91 Likewise, in Prince v. Massachusetts,92 the
Court held that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is
broader than over like actions of adults." 93 While recognizing the right
of a child to practice her religion, the Court justified the application of
a child labor law to prevent a minor adherent of the Jehovah's Wit-
nesses from engaging in public proselyting activities (selling religious
tracts), noting:
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary
use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not
83. Hafen, Puberty, Privacy, and Protection: The Risks of Children's "Rights", 63
A.B.A. J. 1383, 1385 (1977).
84. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
85. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
86. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
87. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966). But see Swisher v. Brady, 438
U.S. 204 (1978); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). See generally 3 L.
WARDLE, C. BLAKEsLEY & J. PARKER, CONTEMPORARY FAmILY LAW, PRINCIPLES,
POLICY AND PRACTICE chs. 24-26 (1988); Bird, Conlin, & Frank, Children in
Trouble: The Juvenile Justice System, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 461 (R.
Horowitz & H. Davidson eds. 1984).
88. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
89. Id. at 682.
90. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
91. See generally Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some
Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", B.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 33-
37, 44-48 (1976).
92. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
93. Id. at 168.
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affecting adults.... What may be wholly permissible for adults therefore may
not be so for children, either with or without their parents' presence.
... We think that with reference to the public proclaiming of religion, upon
the street and in other similar public places, the power of the state to control
the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults,
as is true in the case of other freedoms, and the rightful boundary of its power
has not been crossed in this case.
9 4
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,95 the Supreme Court
held that minors do not enjoy the same latitude of expression under
the first amendment as adults.96 Finally, in Ginsberg v. New York,
the Supreme Court suggested that if the state is acting as the agent of
the parents, it may have more authority to regulate and restrict the
actions of minors than it would otherwise have.97
Like the parents' rights cases, these minors' rights cases involved
"state versus individual" conflicts. They did not involve conflicts be-
tween parents and children. Thus, like the parents' rights cases, the
minors' rights cases tell us about the limits of state authority, not
about the rights of minors vis A vis their parents.
94. Id. at 169-70.
95. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
96. Id. at 681-84 (upholding suspension of high school student for speech nominating
student body office candidate filled with offensive sexual innuendos). See also
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. -853 (1982)(interpreted as holding that "all mem-
bers of the court, otherwise sharply divided, acknowledged that the school board
has the authority to remove [from a school library] books that are vulgar."
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986)).
97. 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968). However, in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985),
the Court limited the parental delegation doctrine. In T.LO., a teacher found a
14-year-old girl smoking in a restroom at school. The girl was taken to the princi-
pal's office where she denied using cigarettes at all. Over her objections, her
purse was taken and searched by an assistant vice principal. In addition to ciga-
rettes, the purse contained a quantity of marihuana, a pipe, plastic bags, many one
dollar bills, a list of students who owed her money, and two incriminating letters.
This evidence was admitted in a juvenile court delinquency proceeding against
her. The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed her adjudication as a delinquent
because the search of her purse violated the fourth amendment. The United
States Supreme Court reversed and held that the probable cause requirements of
the fourth amendment do not apply as strictly to children at school as in other
contexts. The Court flatly rejected the school's sweeping argument that the
fourth amendment did not apply at all because the school officials were merely
acting as agents of parents.
[Plublic school officials do not merely exercise authority voluntarily con-
ferred on them by individual parents; rather, they act in furtherance of
publicly mandated educational and disciplinary policies.... In carrying
out searches and other disciplinary functions pursuant to such policies,
school officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surro-
gates for the parents, and they cannot claim the parents' immunity from
the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985).
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B. Minors' Abortion Privacy Rights
Despite general deference to parental authority in parent-child dis-
putes, the Supreme Court in recent years has recognized the constitu-
tional right of minors to make at least one specific, profoundly
important decision over parental objection and against parental oppo-
sition-the abortion decision.
In Roe v. Wade,98 the Supreme Court held that the Constitution
shelters an unwritten but fundamental right of privacy which is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision to have an abortion.99 Ap-
plying strict scrutiny, the Court invalidated a Texas statute that pro-
hibited all abortions except those necessary to save the life of the
mother, indicating that all non-medically essential regulations of abor-
tion, at least before viability, are unconstitutional.10 0 In a concluding
footnote, the Court specifically reserved for another day the issue
whether parental consent requirements were permissible.101
Three years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,102 the
Supreme Court answered that question when it struck down a Mis-
souri statute that required unmarried minors to obtain parental con-
sent before submitting to an abortion. The majority, per Justice
Blackmun, reasoned:
[Tihe State does not have the constitutional authority to give a third party an
absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the physician and his
patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason for with-
holding the consent.
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only
when one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults,
are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.
1 0 3
Recognizing that "the State has somewhat broader authority to regu-
late the activities of children than adults," the Court rejected the as-
serted state justification for its "parental veto" statute. The Court did
not believe the statute would strengthen the family unit by giving par-
ents absolute power to overrule a decision made by a daughter and her
doctor to have an abortion.104 "Neither is it likely that such veto
power will enhance parental authority or control where the minor and
the nonconsenting parent are so fundamentally in conflict and the
very existence of the pregnancy already has fractured the family
structure."105 Four justices refused to join in this opinion, and two
others (Justices Stewart and Powell) who subscribed to the majority
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. Id. at 153.
100. Id. at 163.
101. Id. at 165 n.67.
102. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
103. Id. at 74.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 75.
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opinion added their concurring opinions, emphasizing that the pri-
mary defect of the statute was "its imposition of an absolute limitation
on the minor's right to obtain an abortion."
10 6
Three years later in Bellotti v. Baird,o 7 the Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment of a federal district court holding unconstitu-
tional a Massachusetts statute which required a minor to seek
parental consent for abortion and which provided that a state court
could override a parent's refusal to consent to the abortion only if it
found the abortion to be in the best interests of the minor. If the mi-
nor was mature, she would still be obligated to convince the state
court that the abortion was in her best interest. While eight members
of the Court agreed that the statute was invalid under the Danforth
doctrine, a majority could not agree on the reasoning for this
invalidity.
Justice Powell, writing for a plurality of four justices, carefully re-
viewed the Supreme Court precedents regarding minors' rights. He
then identified three reasons justifying the conclusion that the consti-
tutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults:
"the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing."1 08 The extension to minors of proce-
dural protections, including special proceedings in juvenile courts, was
based on the unique vulnerability of minors.10 9
[Tihe Court has held that the States validly may limit the freedom of children
to choose for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with
potentially serious consequences. These rulings have been grounded in the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, mi-
nors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. 1 1 0
The deeply-rooted tradition of respect for parental authority also was
underscored.
While we do not pretend any special wisdom on this subject, we cannot ignore
that central to many of these theories, and deeply rooted in our Nation's his-
tory and tradition, is the belief that the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children. Indeed, "constitutional interpreta-
tion has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their
own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure
of our society .. "
Properly understood, then, the tradition of parental authority is not incon-
sistent with our tradition of individual liberty; rather, the former is one of the
basic presuppositions of the latter. Legal restrictions on minors, especially
those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances
for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
106. Id. at 90.
107. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
108. Id. at 634.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 635.
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society meaningful and rewarding.1 1 1
But the uniqueness of the abortion dilemma necessitated that an ex-
ception be made to the general rule of parental control.
The pregnant minor's options are much different from those facing a mi-
nor in other situations, such as deciding whether to marry. A minor not per-
mitted to marry before the age of majority is required simply to postpone her
decision. She and her intended spouse may preserve the opportunity for later
marriage should they continue to desire it. A pregnant adolescent, however,
cannot preserve for long the possibility of aborting, which effectively expires
in a matter of weeks from the onset of pregnancy.
1 12
Thus, Justice Powell's plurality concluded that the Massachusetts
statute was defective because it required all minors seeking abortions
to try to obtain parental consent first.113
Justice Stevens, writing for four other members of the Court, how-
ever, disagreed with this last point. The Stevens' plurality would not
go so far as to say that parental notification could not be required.
Rather, they reasoned that the Massachusetts statute was defective
because it gave the state court judge "an absolute veto over the mi-
nor's decisions, based on his judgment of her best interests."114
In 1981 the Supreme Court upheld a Utah statute requiring doctors
to notify "if possible" the parents of minors seeking abortions. In H.L.
v. Matheson,1 5 the Court repeated and endorsed Justice Powell's
analysis in Bellotti (II) of the general constitutional validity of "paren-
tal notice and consent" requirements; underscored that the case at bar
did not involve a "mature and emancipated" minor; and emphasized
that mere notice, giving parents an opportunity to counsel their
daughters and consult with their physicians, did not constitute a
"veto" of the minor's abortion decision."16 The Court held that just
because the "requirement of notice to parents may inhibit some mi-
nors from seeking abortions is not a valid basis to void the statute."117
Justice Stevens added a concurring opinion specifically endorsing the
requirement of parental notice even for "mature" minors."18
Two years later, in Planned Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft, 119
the Supreme Court upheld a Missouri statute requiring parental or
111. Id. at 638-39 (citations omitted).
112. Id. at 642.
113. Id. at 647-48.
114. Id. at 654. Inasmuch as the ninth justice, Justice White, dissented, finding no
constitutional impediment in the Massachusetts law, i.e., that the statute was not
constitutionally defective because it required parental participation, that would
appear to be the position endorsed by the majority of the Court. Id. at 656-57.
115. 450 U.S. 398, 405 (1981).
116. Id. at 411.
117. Id. at 413.
118. Id. at 425.
119. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
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judicial consent for abortions performed on minors. For a plurality of
two, Justice Powell wrote:
[T]he legal standards with respect to parental-consent requirements are not in
dispute.... A State's interest in protecting immature minors will sustain a
requirement of a consent substitute, either parental or judicial. It is clear,
however, that "the State must provide an alternative procedure whereby a
pregnant minor may demonstrate that she is sufficiently mature to make the
abortion decision herself or that, despite her immaturity, an abortion would be
in her best interests."1 2 0
Applying the general principle that "courts should construe a stat-
ute to avoid a danger of unconstitutionality,"12 1 Justice Powell con-
cluded that the Missouri statute conformed to the constitutional
standard. Three other Justices agreed that this provision was valid
simply "because it imposes no undue burden on any right that a minor
may have to undergo an abortion."
122
In a companion case, City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health, Inc.,123 however, the Court clearly signalled that it was
not yet ready to retreat from the position or reasoning of Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, though it was still committed to extending its
logic. In Akron, the Court invalidated a city ordinance that required
all minors aged fourteen or younger to obtain parental or judicial con-
sent prior to obtaining an abortion. The majority, per Justice Black-
mun, reasoned that the city could not presume that all minors under
the age of fifteen were too immature to make an abortion decision or
that abortion may never be in their best interest without parental
approval.
124
In 1987 the Court faced another case dealing with the abortion
rights of minors. Hartigan v. Zbarazl2s involved an Illinois statute
which generally required a twenty-four hour delay between the actual
or constructive notification of a parent of a minor's decision to have an
abortion and the performance of the abortion unless the parent agreed
in writing to the abortion (or unless other exceptional circumstances
existed). The purpose of the statute was to provide a minimum oppor-
tunity for actual parent-child consultation, which could be waived by
the parent or in other exceptional circumstances. In Akron, the
Supreme Court had held that general "waiting period" requirements
were unconstitutional as applied to adult women seeking abortions.126
In H.L., however, the Court had upheld a requirement of parental no-
120. Id. at 490-91.
121. Id. at 493.
122. Id. at 505 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part joined by White, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
123. 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
124. Justice O'Connor, writing for three dissenters, disagreed. Id. at 468-70.
125. 108 S. Ct. 479 (1987), per mern, aff'g 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1986), reh 'g denied,
108 S. Ct. 1064 (1987).
126. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
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tification on the express understanding that it would facilitate paren-
tal consultation, which obviously may cause some delay.2 By a two-
to-one vote, a Seventh Circuit appellate court in Hartigan affirmed a
district court judgment holding the Illinois law unconstitutional under
Akron.128 The United States Supreme Court affirmed without expla-
nation by an equally divided vote.
Obviously, the cases dealing with minors' rights to abortions are
very controversial and are subject to widely varying interpretations.
It appears, however, that at least three tentative conclusions may be
drawn. First, the minor's right to abortion privacy, which she may
exercise against parental opposition, is substantially related to the uni-
queness of the abortion decision, which involves an existing pregnancy
and a relatively brief period of time in which an abortion may safely
be performed. Second, all of the abortion cases involving minors have
involved challenges to state laws restricting the pregnant minor.
While some of the laws have assumed the form of mere regulations to
support parental authority (like the Utah law upheld in HL.), most of
them have been viewed by a majority of the Court in a different
light-as thinly disguised direct attempts by the state to prevent a vul-
nerable group of individuals from exercising their valuable, but un-
popular, right to choose to have an abortion. The importance of the
"state delegation" language in Danforth cannot be overstated: the
Court deemed the parental consent statute to be an attempt by the
state to veto minors' abortions by delegating unlawful authority to
persons who might oppose the abortion-the parents. Finally, except
in the case of "mature minors,"129 or when it actually would be harm-
ful to the minor, parental participation in the abortion decision of a
minor may constitutionally be required. The Court has strongly en-
dorsed the principle of parental consultation to the extent it does not
involve an absolute parental veto. 30
V. CASES CONSIDERING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
ABOUT THE PROVISION OF CONTRACEPTIVES
TO MINORS
A. Supreme Court Cases
In several cases the Supreme Court has recognized a right of adults
to have access to contraceptives. In 1965 the Supreme Court invali-
dated a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by mar-
127. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
128. Hartigan v. Zbaraz, 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1986), affrg 584 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Ill.
1984).
129. Interestingly, even Justice Powell, who championed the "mature minor" notion,
admitted he was not sure how the term should be defined. See Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622, 643 n.23 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
130. H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 410, 412 (1981).
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tied adults. In Griswold v. Connecticut,131 Justice Douglas, writing
for the Court, explained that the law infringed upon a right of marital
privacy which was found to emanate from the "penumbras" of certain
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The focus of the majority
opinion was the need to protect the most "enduring," "sacred," and
"noble"132 institution of society, the "intimate relation of husband and
wife"133 from "destructive" and "repulsive" state intrusion. Four jus-
tices (including two dissenters) refused to endorse Justice Douglas'
"penumbra" privacy analysis.134
Seven years later in Eisenstadt v. Baird ,135 the Court invalidated a
Massachusetts law which made it a felony for anyone other than a
registered doctor or pharmacist to dispense contraceptives, and which
allowed doctors and pharmacists to distribute contraceptives only to
married persons, except when necessary to prevent the spread of dis-
ease. A doctor convicted of violating the law when he gave a contra-
ceptive to a young unmarried college woman successfully challenged
the law. Without stating that single persons have any fundamental
right to engage in nonmarital sexual activity or to use contraceptives,
the Court held that the Massachusetts law violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the fourteenth amendment. Writing for the four-mem-
ber majority, Justice Brennan rejected as unfounded and unproven
the state's claim that the law deterred premarital or illicit sex and
furthered public health interests of the state. He also declared:
[Whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the
rights must be the same for the unmarried and the married alike.... If the
right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or
single, to be free of unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.
1 3 6
Despite this language, the extent to which single adults have a con-
stitutionally protected right of privacy to put contraceptives to their
intended use-to engage in consensual, extramarital sexual rela-
tions-is "somewhat unclear."137 Prior to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Bowers v. Hardwick,13s several lower courts held that
consensual sexual intercourse between unmarried persons was pro-
tected by the constitutional right of privacy. 3 9 However, in Bowers
131. 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1975).
132. Id. at 486.
133. Id. at 482.
134. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 502 (White J., concurring); id. at 507
(Black, J., dissenting); id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
135. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
136. Id. at 453.
137. 3 PRIVACY LAW AND PRACTICE 20.02[2], at 20-83 (G. Trubow ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter PRIVACY LAW].
138. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
139. See, e.g., Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated and remanded,
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the Supreme Court rejected a constitutional privacy-based challenge
to a Georgia sodomy law, indicating that it was not receptive to an
expansive reading of its substantive due process (privacy) precedents
and emphasizing that those cases involved protection of basic relation-
ships of family ("family, marriage or procreation")140 by means of so-
cial practices having "ancient roots."141 Bowers suggests that "privacy
rights might not encompass private sexual intercourse between con-
senting unmarried persons." 14 2 Nevertheless, the Eisenstadt ruling
that state laws may not prohibit contraceptive sales to unmarried
adults remains firmly embedded in current constitutional doctrine.143
The Supreme Court has only once discussed a statute restricting
the use of or access to contraceptives by minors. In 1977, the Supreme
Court invalidated a New York statute making it a crime for anyone
but a pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons sixteen or
over; for anyone to advertise or display contraceptives; or for anyone
to distribute contraceptives to minors under sixteen years of age. In
Carey v. Population Services International,144 Justice Brennan, writ-
ing for a majority, found the prohibition against advertising and the
restriction that only pharmacists distribute contraceptives to be un-
constitutional under the plain principles of Griswold and Eisen-
stadt.145 But he could not muster a majority to support his analysis of
the invalidity of the provision forbidding the sale of contraceptives to
minors under sixteen years of age. Writing for only four members of
the Court, Justice Brennan reasoned that "the right of privacy in con-
nection with decisions relating to procreation extends to minors as
782 F.2d 1202 (4th Cir. 1986); Baxter v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982),
rev'd, 769 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1072 (1986), reh'g denied,
478 U.S. 189 (1986); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977). See also
City of Chicago v. Wilson, 75 Ill. 2d 525, 389 N.E.2d 522 (1978); State v. Pilcher, 242
N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1976).
140. 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1986).
141. Id.
142. See PRIVACY LAW, supra note 137, at 20-85. See also supra note 137 and accompa-
nying text. Likewise, in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1977), the majority
justified its holding that a Wisconsin law restricting marriage by persons with
unpaid child support obligations was unconstitutional because inter alia the state
allowed sexual relations legally to take place only within marriage. Wisconsin's"
fornication statute was cited with approval. Id. at n.1l. Truly, "[t]he right of pri-
vacy as a constitutional guarantee is at once ubiquitous and elusive.... Although
courts and commentators agree on the moral and legal principles on which the
right is based, they disagree on its definition and application." PRIVACY LAw,
supra note 137 at T 19.01.
143. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 921-23 (1978). See generally
Parker & Wardle, Contraception and Abortion, in I CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
§ 6:01, at 6-9, nn.34, 39 (1988).
144. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
145. Id. at 689-91.
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well as adults." 146 Since the state may not restrict access to contracep-
tives by adults, he reasoned, "a fortiori" it may not restrict minors'
access to contraceptives. 47 He further rejected the idea that a state
could adopt a policy imposing unwanted teenage pregnancy as a pun-
ishment for fornication.148 And since the state had conceded that
"there is no evidence that teenage extramarital sexual activity in-
creases in proportion to the availability of contraceptives," he rejected
the argument "that juvenile sexual activity will be deterred by making
contraceptives more difficult to obtain."14
9
However, a majority of the Supreme Court refused to endorse
either Justice Brennan's analysis of this issue generally or his declara-
tion that the constitutional rights of procreative privacy recognized by
the Court in cases involving adults extend to minors also. Justices
White and Stevens separately agreed that the prohibition against dis-
tribution of contraceptives was unconstitutional, emphasizing (with
apparent reference to the state's concession) that the state had failed
to prove that the prohibition against distribution of contraceptives to
minors deterred any minors from engaging in sexual relations.50
However, they explicitly rejected as "frivolous" the idea that minors
had a constitutional right "to put contraceptives to their intended
use."''1 Justice Stevens also emphatically distinguished the abortion
cases.' 52 Justice Powell likewise separately agreed that the law re-
stricting sale of contraceptives to minors under sixteen was unconsti-
tutional. He, like Justice Stevens, found the law to be defective
because it would even prevent parents from distributing contracep-
tives to their own children.153 But Justice Powell strongly endorsed
other state regulations, including parental consultation require-
ments.l4 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented, the
latter filing an opinion unequivocally endorsing the propriety of state
legislation designed to "discourage unmarried minors under sixteen
from having promiscuous sexual intercourse with one another."
155
The multiple opinions in Carey have spawned a kaleidoscope of
theories and approaches, but no clear constitutional doctrine.156 In
146. Id. at 693.
147. Id. at 694 (Brennan, J.).
148. Id. at 695 (Brennan, J.).
149. Id. (Brennan, J.). Today this statement would not be true. See infra notes 216-20
and accompanying text.
150. Id. at 703 (White, J., concurring); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
151. Id. at 703 (White, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 707-08 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 713 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 719 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
156. "While it is clear from Carey that a state may not prohibit the sale of contracep-
tives to minors, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled specifically whether paren-
tal consent or notice may be required." Dodson, supra note 14, § 4.17, at 142.
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the decade since Carey was decided, the Supreme Court has not con-
sidered further the question of minors' rights regarding the use of con-
traceptives. In 1981, however, the Court decided a related case that
has some bearing upon the issue. In Michael M. v. Superior Court,157
the Court upheld a California "statutory rape" criminal law against an
equal protection challenge alleging gender discrimination. The Cali-
fornia law, like laws in many states, provided a criminal penalty for
males, but not females, who violated the prohibition against sexual in-
tercourse by males with underage girls. While the Court had no single
opinion, a clear majority of the Justices explicitly expressed their be-
lief that states constitutionally have the authority to prohibit and pun-
ish sexual intercourse among teenagers.158
B. Lower Court Cases
While a majority of the Supreme Court has never held that the
Constitution protects the right of minors to obtain or to use contracep-
tives without parental involvement, the issue of parental notification
of, or participation in, the provision of contraceptives to their minor
children has been addressed by the lower federal courts in thirteen
reported decisions since 1975.159 However, in eight of the thirteen de-
cisions, the federal courts based their judgments exclusively on statu-
tory grounds, ignoring the alleged constitutional issues.1 60 In two
157. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
158. Id. at 472 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., plurality opinion for four justices); id. at 497 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting opinion expressing "no doubt about the validity of a state law
prohibiting all unmarried teenagers from engaging in sexual intercourse."). The
dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, which was joined by Justices Marshall and
White, however, noted that the prior decisions of the Court would not foreclose a
challenge to such a statute. Id. at 491 n.5. Actually, even though Justice White
joined Brennan's dissent, the carefully phrased Brennan footnote should not be
read to suggest that Justice White would be prepared to hold that states constitu-
tionally cannot prohibit sexual activity by teenagers; in Carey he emphatically
suggested that such regulation would be permissible. Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 684, 702, 703 (1977).
159. The issue also has arisen in some state courts. See, e.g., Doe v. Planned
Parenthood Ass'n, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75, appeal dismissed and cert denied,
414 U.S. 805 (1973)(rejecting claim of teenager and her class that government-
funded planning clinic must provide contraceptives to minors without parental
notice or consent). The same statutes were involved in federal litigation later.
See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
160. In addition to the four "squeal rule" cases described infra, notes 163-97, see Jane
Doe's 1 Through 4 v. Utah Dep't of Health, 776 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1985)(affirming
injunction against enforcement of Utah parental consent requirement as violative
of Title X (public health service family planning)); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v.
Dandoy, 635 F. Supp. 184 (D. Utah 1986)(holding Utah law requiring prior written
consent of minor's parent or guardian before contraceptive services are provided
to unmarried minors is violative of and preempted by Title XIX (Medicaid),
aff'd, 810 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1987) (Utah parental consent requirement violates
and is preempted by Title XIX (Medicaid)); Doe v. Picket, 480 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D.
1989]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
other cases, the courts based their decisions on both statutory and con-
stitutional grounds.161 In only three of the reported decisions did the
lower federal courts base their judgments solely upon constitutional
grounds.162 Most courts that have reached the privacy issue have ap-
proved of some parental involvement in the decision of whether to
allow minors access to contraceptives. Most courts have distinguished
parental consent requirements from parental notice requirements,
usually indicating that mandatory parental notification is constitution-
ally permissible, while parental consent is not.
The most prominent parental notice cases involved the so-called
"squeal rules" promulgated in January 1983 by the Department of
Health and Human Services (DHHS). Those regulations required pa-
rental notification when prescription contraceptives were provided to
minors by federally funded family planning clinics.163 Within two
weeks the regulations were enjoined by two federal district courts for
essentially the same reasons, and by the end of the year, both injunc-
tions had been affirmed by two federal courts of appeals.164
The decisions of the four federal courts in the "squeal rule" cases
are typical of most federal court decisions that have addressed this is-
sue because they were predicated solely on statutory grounds. All
four courts held that the regulations were invalid because they were
W.Va. 1979)(holding West Virginia Department of Health policy of denying con-
traceptive services to minors who do not have parental consent violative of arid
preempted by Title X (family planning), Title IV-A (A.F.D.C.), Title XIX (Medi-
caid), and Title XX (family planning)).
161. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah
1983) (holding Utah law requiring parental notification before provision of contra-
ceptives to minors inconsistent with and preempted by Title IV-A (AFDC), Title
X (public health family planning), Title XIX (Medicaid), and also violative of
minors' rights of privacy); T.H. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975)(holding
Utah regulations requiring parental consent for the provision of contraceptives to
minors violative of and preempted by federal law-Title IV-A (AFDC) and Title
XIX (Medicaid)--as well as unconstitutionally infringing on the privacy of mi-
nors), aff'd on statutory grounds only, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
162. See Doe v. Irwin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977)(holding that the distribu-
tion under color of state law of contraceptive devices to minors without parental
knowledge or consent violates the constitutional rights of parents), vacated and
remanded for reconsideration, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1979), judgment reentered
and confirmed, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977)(again concluding that the
provision of contraceptives to minors without notification or consent of parents
violates the constitutional rights of parents), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.
1980)(holding that the voluntary provision to willing minors of contraceptives
without parental notification does not violate any constitutional rights). cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
163. 42 C.F.R. § 59.5 (1983).
164. See New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub non New
York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood Fed'n v.
Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Planned Parenthood
Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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inconsistent with the congressional language and intent of Title X.165
The courts found that the language of the statute and its legislative
history indicated that while Congress wanted minors to be encouraged
to consult with their parents concerning contraceptives, it had rejected
amendments to require parental notification.166
In both cases the courts found that the primary effect of the pro-
posed "squeal rules" would be to deter adolescents from using family
planning clinics and to increase significantly the incidence of teenage
pregnancies, abortions, and births in America, thus frustrating the in-
tent of the legislation.167 These factual findings rested upon the fail-
ure of the DHHS to factually support its position and upon
"substantial statistical and medical documentation"168 provided by
Planned Parenthood and state family planning agencies.169 Since the
DHHS was only authorized to enact regulations consistent with con-
gressional legislation, the "squeal rule" regulations were invalid.
None of the four courts analyzed whether the parental notice require-
ment would violate any constitutional privacy rights of minors; the.
sole basis for the opinion and judgment in each case was congressional
intent.
Lower federal courts twice have invalidated on constitutional
grounds state statutes or regulations protecting parental participation
when contraceptives are provided to minor children.170 Both cases
were decided by the Utah District Court. But in both cases, the courts
had already found the state statutes to be invalid because they were
preempted by federal statutes or regulations. In one of these cases,
165. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 to 300a-4 (1981).
166. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd sub nom.
New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191, 1196 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood
Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 669 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Planned
Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650, 655-64 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
167. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub nom.
New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191, 1194 (2d Cir. 1983); Planned Parenthood
Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 666 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd sub nonm Planned
Parenthood Fed'n v. Heckler, 712 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The validity of these
factual determinations is debatable. See infra notes 217-20 and accompanying
text.
168. New York v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd sub nom.
New York v. Heckler, 719 F.2d 1191 (2d Cir. 1983).
169. Planned Parenthood Fed'n v. Schweiker, 559 F. Supp. 658, 663, 664 n.1l, 666
(D.D.C. 1983); Note, The Squeal Rule: Statutory Resolution of Constitutional Im-
plications-Burdening the Minor's Right of Privacy, 1984 DuKE L.J. 1325, 1333
n.50 [hereinafter Note, The Squeal Rule]. See also Note, Minors'Right of Privacy:
Access to Contraceptives Without Parental Notification, 7 J. JuvENILE L. 238
(1983) [hereinafter Note, Minors'Right of Privacy].
170. See Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Matheson, 528 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983);
T.H. v. Jones, 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd on statutory grounds only,
425 U.S. 986 (1976).
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the court gratuitously opined that parental notification did not violate
the constitutional privacy rights of minors.
In T.H. v. Jones,171 the three-judge federal district court held that a
Utah welfare regulation requiring written parental consent before
government-funded family planning agencies could distribute contra-
ceptives to minors was preempted by federal law when applied to fed-
eral family planning programs. This holding was based on arguments
similar to those used in the "squeal rule" cases reveiwed above. The
three-judge district court also found the Utah parental notification
regulation to be unconstitutionally violative of the privacy rights of
minors.172
Reviewing the contraceptive and abortion decisions of the Supreme
Court, as well as the decisions recognizing the entitlement of minors
to certain constitutional protections against the state, the court was
convinced that the Utah regulation affected conduct protected by the
constitutional right of privacy.173 "More importantly," the court could
perceive "no developmental differences between minors and adults
that may affect the gravity of the right asserted by sexually active mi-
nors to family planning services and materials."174 The state's asser-
tion of substantial interests in protecting minor females and in
supporting parental authority within the family was rejected as un-
compelling (less-than-substantial state interest) because the regula-
tion only affected the access of indigent minors to contraceptives, 7 5
because a teenager's decision to use contraceptives is not irrevocable,
and because such a decision does not preclude continuing parental gui-
dance.17 6 But the court also suggested that parental notification
would not violate the right of privacy of minors.1 77 One of the mem-
171. 425 F. Supp. 873 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd on statutory grounds only, 425 U.S. 986
(1976).
172. Id. at 882.
173. Id. at 880-82.
174. Id. at 880.
175. Id. at 881.
176. Id. at 882.
177. [We hold that the state may not enforce the choice of parents in conflict
with a minor's constitutional right of free access to birth control infor-
mation and services. This is not to say, of course, that the state may not
require notification to parents or guardians before minors receive such
services.
Id. at 882. It may have been improper for the three-judge district court in T.H. to
reach the constitutional issue. Previously, the same statute had been attacked by
the same class in a state court, and the statute had been upheld against claims of
privacy by the state's supreme court. Id. at 876 (citing Doe v. Planned Parenthood
Ass'n, 29 Utah 2d 356, 510 P.2d 75 (1973), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 805 (1973)).
Even if the privacy rights claim was not expressly raised in that case, the doctrine
of claim preclusion would prevent the parties in the first case (and those in priv-
ity with them) from "splitting" his or their cause of action and challenging the
same statute on another theory a little later.
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bers of the three-judge panel strenuously dissented from the conclu-
sion of the majority that even parental consent was
unconstitutional.378 The Supreme Court subsequently affirmed the
judgment solely on statutory grounds, explicitly declining to endorse
the lower court's suggestions that mandatory parental consent prior to
the provision of contraceptives to minors is unconstitutional.179
Eight years later in Planned Parenthood Association v. Mathe-
son, 8 0 another federal district judge in Utah invalidated a Utah stat-
ute requiring parental notification before the provision of
contraceptives to minors. On the basis of arguments and legislative
history similar to that found persuasive in the "squeal rule" cases and
in the TH. decision, the district court found the Utah law to be super-
seded by the federal statutes and regulations favoring confidential-
ity. 8 1  Additionally, reviewing the contraception and abortion
decisiors, the court rejected any distinction between parental notifica-
tion and parental consent because, functionally, both had a chilling
effect oti teenage access to contraceptives. The court also rejected the
distinction between abortion and contraceptive use by minors because
both decisions were" 'among the most private and sensitive' "a person
could make, 8 2 and because of the risk of harm (pregnancy) that faces
the sexually active minor denied access to contraceptives. 8 3
Four lower court decisions indicate that mandatory parental notifi-
cation would not violate the constitutional rights of a minor seeking
contraceptives. In addition to the dicta of the three-judge district
court in TH. distinguishing parental notification from parental con-
sent, a federal district court in Michigan twice upheld the claims of
and granted relief to parents who urged that the practice of state and
state-funded family planning clinics of distributing contraceptives to
minors without parental notification or consent violated the funda-
mental constitutional rights of parents. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit
held that the Constitution does not mandate or prohibit either paren-
tal notification or teenager confidentiality.
In March of 1977, the district court in Doe v. Irwin 384 thoroughly
considered the claim to privacy rights of minors as well as the inter-
ests of the state and the rights of parents, concluding that the failure
of state family planning agencies to notify parents before providing
contraceptives to minors unconstitutionally infringed parents' rights.
The case involved a suit by parents whose minor, unemancipated
178. Id. at 882 (Anderson, J., dissenting).
179. T.H. v. Jones, 425 U.S. 986 (1976).
180. 582 F. Supp. 1001 (D. Utah 1983).
181. Id. at 1004-07.
182. Id. at 1008 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977)).
183. Id. at 1008-09.
184. 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
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daughter was given without their knowledge or consent prescriptive
and nonprescriptive contraceptives by a state-funded, county-adminis-
tered family planning clinic. The parents sought a declaratory judg-
ment that the clinic policy of distributing contraceptives to minors
without parental notification or consent violated the constitutional
rights of the parents. They also sought an injunction against enforce-
ment of the policy. The district court concluded that "parents have a
constitutionally protected right to participate in the very important
decisions of their minor, unemancipated children as to whether or not
to initiate sexual activity or to undertake the substantial medical risks
of certain contraceptives." 8 5 The district court considered the
center's practice of not notifying parents to be tantamount to "totally
exclud[ing] the parents of the child from . . . a momentous deci-
sion.' 1 8 6 Accordingly, it granted the relief sought by the parents.
After the Supreme Court decided Carey, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded Irwin for re-
consideration in light of Carey.87 A few months later, the district
court rendered another opinion reaffirming and readopting the earlier
order and opinion and reemphasizing that the constitutional rights of
privacy of parents prohibited state actors from providing contracep-
tives to minors without parental notification.188
Reviewing the Supreme Court decisions protecting parental au-
thority, the court emphasized that the right of parents to be notified
prior to the provision of contraceptives to their minor children by a
state agency lay "at the heart of our nation's traditions and collective
conscience . . . [and our] fundamental rights protected by the First,
Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Con-
stitution."18 9 The fact that the state-supported family planning clinic
"surreptitiously interacts with the child and secretly provides the
child with prescriptive, potentially hazardous, contraceptives, has the
practical result of restricting parents' alternatives both in the exercise
of authority in their own households and of responsibility to direct the
rearing of their children."190 The denial of notification to parents de-
prived them of the opportunity to relate general moral teachings they
may have given their children to particular situations which the chil-
dren may be personally facing.191
The court distinguished protective or procedural constitutional
rights which have been extended to minors from "choice" rights
185. Id. at 1209.
186. Id. at 1210.
187. Doe v. Irwin, 559 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1977).
188. Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247 (W.D. Mich. 1977), rev'd, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir.
1980), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
189. Id. at 1251.
190. Id. at 1253.
191. Id.
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which have largely not been extended to minors. Carey was distin-
guished because the statute in that case prohibited any distribution of
non-prescriptive, non-hazardous contraceptives to any minors, even by
their own parents, whereas in Irwin, parents were seeking to vindi-
cate their rights against the interference of a state agency. 9 2
In 1980, a unanimous panel of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit reversed the district court decision in Irwin in a concise and
decisive opinion.193 The court acknowledged that parents have a con-
stitutional right to raise their children, including the right to inculcate
moral values. The court further noted that while the Supreme Court
had not indicated whether parental notification regarding the provi-
sion of contraceptives was constitutionally permissible, at least one
other district court, in addition to the court below, had concluded that
it was allowable.-9 4 But the key to the disposition of the case at bar
was the absence of state compulsion. In Meyer, Pierce, Yoder, and
Prince, the states actually had required or prohibited certain conduct.
But in Irwin Michigan had imposed no compulsory requirements or
prohibitions; parents in Michigan "remain[ed] free to exercise their
traditional care, custody and control over their unemancipated chil-
dren."195 The court noted:
There was no evidence that parents are excluded from any decisions or sup-
planted by the activities of the [state-funded family planning clinic]. The un-
contradicted evidence was that personnel of the Center encourage minors to
involve their parents in their decisions concerning sexual activity and birth
control, and even offer to help bring the parents into discussions of these
subjects.
1 9 6
The court of appeals emphasized that the question was not whether a
state could require or prohibit parental notification, the state in this
case did neither. "Rather, it is whether the Constitution requires such
a condition .... [I]t is clearly a matter for the state to determine
whether such a requirement is necessary or desirable .... There is no
basis for a federal court to impose conditions in the absence of an over-
riding constitutional requirement."197
Thus, to date neither the advocates of parental rights nor the advo-
cates of minors' rights have been very successful in persuading courts
that the controversy regarding parental involvement in the provision
of contraceptives to minors is primarily a constitutional issue. The
Supreme Court has summarily rebuffed a lower court holding that mi-
nors have a constitutional right to confidential access to contracep-
192. Id. at 1257-60.
193. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. -1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
194. Id at 1167-68 (referring to the T.H. decision discussed supra notes 171-78 and ac-
companying text).
195. Id. at 1168.
196. Id. at 1168 n.2.
197. Id. at 1169.
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tives; the Sixth Circuit has rejected the claim that parents always have
a constitutional right to participate; and most cases have been decided
on statutory, not constitutional, grounds.
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM VS. CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS
A. The Limitations of Parents' Rights and Minors' Rights Analysis
Even accepting reasonable extensions of the parents' rights and mi-
nors' rights cases, it is difficult to conclude that the policy dispute re-
garding parental involvement when contraceptives are provided to
children generally is or should be controlled by either of the constitu-
tional privacy doctrines. Comparing the two doctrines and balancing
them against each other in the abstract, it is apparent the parental
rights doctrine is the more fully developed in terms of both case prece-
dents and legal and social history and would be given priority in any
general comparative discussion of relative rights. But that is of little
practical analytical benefit; what matters is not abstract analysis but
specific application of precise aspects of these broad doctrines to the
concrete facts of the particular case.
Parental rights advocates are undoubtedly correct in their asser-
tion that the provision of contraceptive instruction, products, or serv-
ices to a minor is precisely the kind of a decision that comes within the
constitutionally protected right of parents to supervise. It is fraught
with enormous moral, religious, health, and educational significance.
And it is the kind of practical and personal decision for which immedi-
ate and personal parental direction is especially appropriate during
"the crucial adolescent stage of development,"' 9 8 and for which the
past teaching of abstract principles alone may not provide sufficient
guidance.199
The primary flaw with application of "parental rights" analysis to
resolve disputes regarding the provision of contraceptive services to
minors is that the Constitution only secures rights of individuals
against government intrusion. The Constitution secures few, if any,
rights against private invasion.200 Just as constitutional rights of free
speech are not infringed by purely private heckling, the constitutional
rights of parents are not violated by purely private acts of private
parties.
198. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972).
199. See Doe v. Irwin, 441 F. Supp. 1247, 1253 (W.D. Mich. 1977).
200. Arguably, the thirteenth amendment (abolition of slavery) and the eighteenth
amendment (prohibition of manufacture, sale, or commerce of intoxicating li-
quors) could reach even private conduct. But the eighteenth amendment was re-
pealed, and the thirteenth amendment has had very little adjudicatory history.
As for state constitutional responsibility for privately inflicted injuries, see
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989).
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Moreover, even when the state is involved in the provision of con-
traceptives to minors, the manner and degree of state involvement is
of enormous significance to the constitutional analysis. If the state re-
quires or prohibits the provision of contraceptive instruction, service,
or products to minors, infringement of the constitutional protection of
parental authority is direct and unavoidable. Then, the state action
could be sustained only if it substantially furthered a significant state
interest.
With respect to the mandatory secret provision of contraceptives to
minors, it is unlikely that the state could identify any sufficiently im-
portant state interest that would be so directly threatened by parental
involvement or that could not be secured by some other means while
accommodating parental concerns. Thus, for example, it is generally
established that mandatory public school sex education programs or
requirements must excuse students whose parents request that their
children not be exposed to that type of teaching or material.20 ' One
commentator noted:
Although the state has legitimate interests in preparing youth for citizen-
ship, for a vocation, and for a satisfactory personal life, the potential for indoc-
trination of children in the public schools in values which conflict with those
of their parents necessitates limitations on the power of the state to require
instruction. Such potential indoctrination conflicts with the first amend-
ment's protection of freedom of speech, its implicit protection of freedom of
thought and the "marketplace of ideas," and the general principle that our
government is a government by consent of the governed. To avoid possible
indoctrinative effects, parents must have a constitutionally protected right to
excuse their children from instruction which conflicts with the parents'
values.2 0 2
Likewise, a state prohibition of parental participation in the provision
of contraceptives to minors would be unconstitutional. A critical de-
fect of the New York statute struck down in Carey was that it prohib-
ited even parents from distributing contraceptives to their minor
children. Thus, it clearly violated parental rights as well as arguably
violated the privacy rights of minors.
On the other hand, if minors' participation in a state program is
actually nonmandatory (as a practical, realistic matter, considering
the situation and circumstances, and not merely "formally volun-
201. See, e.g., Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo County Bd. of Educ., 51 Cal.
App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975), appeal dismissed, 425 U.S. 908 (1976); Medeiros
v. Kiyosaki, 52 Haw. 436, 478 P.2d 314 (1970); Smith v. Ricci, 89 N.J. 514, 446 A.2d
501 (1982), appeal dismissed sub nom Smith v. Brandt, 459 U.S. 962 (1982). See
also Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1969), aff'd, 428 F.2d
471 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Aubrey v. School Dist., 6& Pa.
Commw. 330, 437 A.2d 1306 (1981).
202. Hirschoff, Parents and the Public School Curriculum: Is There a Right to Have
One's Child Excused from Objectionable Instruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 870, 957
(1977). See id. at 909; id. at 920-24; Dent, Religious Children, Secular Schools, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 864 (1988).
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tary"), the constitutional rights of parents may not be infringed.
203
The Constitution does not guarantee that parents can raise their chil-
dren free from all competing teachers, influences, and world views.
Nor does constitutional protection for parental rights prevent the
state from taking a position or expressing a policy on a controversial
subject.20 4 The state could balance the competing privacy interests of
parents and minors and support one or the other in a constitutional
manner.
"Minors' rights" privacy analysis of the issue of teenager access to
contraceptives is clearly the overwhelming favorite of law review
writers.2 05 Nevertheless, advocates of minors' rights analysis encoun-
ter the same initial problem as advocates of parents' rights. the Con-
stitution only guarantees individual rights against state infringement.
It does not guarantee that minors can be free from parental control;
parents are, after all, private parties.
Even when state involvement is present, the type and manner of
that involvement is critical. For instance, a profound difference exists
between a state law prohibiting the provision of contraceptive instruc-
tion, products, or services to minors and a law requiring parental con-
sent. The former involves state action directly restricting the arguable
203. The "voluntariness" of programs that promote or provide contraceptives at public
schools may require careful evaluation.
The atmosphere of the public school intensifies the coercion of its teach-
ing.... As Dean Yudorf has said: "In some ways, public schools are a
communications theorist's dream: the audience is captive and immature;
... the messages are labeled as educational (and not as advertising) ...
and a system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce the
messages."
Dent, supra note 202, at 892.
204. In City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983),
the Court did strike down the city ordinance requiring disclosure of an official
policy against abortion to women seeking an abortion. Id. at 444. See also Thorn-
burg v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
The Court interpreted the Constitution as prohibiting the state from adopting a
theory of when life begins. Id. Because this is a privacy decision, advocates of
parents' or minors' rights might rely on it to argue that the state may not even
take a position regarding contraception. However, Akron can be distinguished
because that case involved the right of abortion privacy, and the Court's decisions
in the abortion cases have been sui generis because abortion is a unique contro-
versy and procedure. Moreover, the unique "logic" of this Akron ruling has not
been applied in any other contexts by the Court.
205. See, e.g., Note, supra note 22; Note, The Squeal Rule, supra note 169; Comment,
supra note 5; Note, supra note 21; Note, Minors' Right of Privacy, supra note 169;
Note, Unemancipated Minors' Right of Access to Contraceptives Without Paren-
tal Consent or Notice-The Squeal Rule and Beyond, 8 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 219
(1983); Utah Legislative Survey, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 125, 196-202 (1984). Compare
the aforementioned authorities with Developments in the Law: The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1372-77 (1980); Note, Parental Consent
Requirements and Privacy Rights of Minors: The Contraceptive Controversy. 88
HARV. L. REV. 1001 (1975).
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constitutional interest of minors. The latter merely balances compet-
ing private interests and defers to the "natural guardians"-a balanced
procedural, not substantive, approach; it is a recognition of priority
among competing private interests, not a creation or delegation of
state power.2 06
Another problem that advocates of minors' rights encounter is that
the Court explicitly and repeatedly has declined to rule that unnar-
ried minors have a constitutional right to put contraceptives to their
intended use. Indeed, a majority of the Court consistently has indi-
cated that states constitutionally may prohibit sexual intercourse by
unmarried minors. Even if minors have a constitutional right to use
contraceptive instruction and materials, it is not the kind of right
which cannot be postponed. On this basis the abortion decision may be
distinguished from the contraceptive decision (just as the marriage de-
cision can be postponed until majority, contraceptive use also can be
postponed).207 If the minor chooses to engage in sexual intercourse
anyway, that decision cannot be attributed to or blamed on the state.
Moreover, from the perspective of general constitutional theory,
the argument that minors have an unwritten, fundamental right of
access to or use of contraceptives is very tenuous. The Court has gen-
erally followed two tests for determining what "unwritten liberties"
are protected by the due process clauses of the Constitution. One is
that the asserted right is "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty,"2 08 or "essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men,"209 or "basic in our system of jurisprudence. 210 The other test
for determining unwritten fundamental rights is that the alleged right
is " 's o rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental,' "211 or determined by a "balance struck by
this country, having regard... [for] what history teaches are the tradi-
tions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it
206. A state requirement of parental consent for an activity may represent an effort to
enforce a state policy by delegating state enforcement authority to the parent. In
Planned Parenthood the Court evaluated the Missouri parental consent to abor-
tion statute from this perspective. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
But parental consent requirements also may represent a state recognition of par-
ents' own private interests in the matter and a decision to defer to and support
the parents' interests. See supra note 97 and accompanying text; supra note 110
and accompanying text. If the parental consent requirement is justified to pro-
tect the parental interest, it would be valid even if it could not be justified to
protect (as a delegation of) the state interest.
207. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 662, 642 (1979). See supra note 112 and accompanying
text.
208. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
209. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
210. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
211. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937)(Cardozo, J.)(quoting Snyder v. Mas-
sachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
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broke,"212 or "respect for the teachings of history, [and] solid recogni-
tion of the basic values that underlie our society." 213 Confidential ac-
cess by unmarried minors to contraceptive instructions or products is
neither essential to the preservation of our democratic republic nor
deeply rooted in the basic values or traditional practices of our na-
tion's history.
214
Finally, advocates of minors' rights analysis encounter significant
empirical difficulties in their effort to establish that use of contracep-
tives by minors is essential to achieving the laudable public interest
they assert-reduction of teenage pregnancy. The logic of their argu-
ment is direct and obvious: contraceptives are designed to prevent
pregnancy when sexual intercourse occurs; therefore, it seems that in-
dividual teenagers would be less likely to become pregnant while us-
ing contraceptives than while not using them. In addition, minors are
more likely to use contraceptives if parental involvement is not
required.215
This simple logic ignores the more complex reality on an individual
212. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
213. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)(Harlan, J., concurring).
214. Six points probably will ultimately prove to be essential to the constitutional doc-
trine of minors' privacy rights regarding contraceptives:
1. Regardless of whether minors have a constitutional right to engage in sexual
activity, some of them are going to do so, and the Court will assess the reasonable-
ness of any restriction as against this group of teens.
2. The Court is very concerned about the injuries (unintended pregnancies)
these teens will incur if denied access to contraceptives. Justice Stevens com-
pared denying teens the use of contraceptives to denying them the use of motor-
cycle helmets. "One need not posit a constitutional right to ride a motorcycle to
characterize such a restriction as irrational and perverse." Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977)(Stevens, J.).
3. Development of empirical data strongly supporting the relationship between
increased teenage pregnancy and access of teens to contraceptives is imperative
for opponents of confidential access by teenagers to contraceptives. Without such
data it will be difficult to distinguish Carey. So critical is such quantitative proof
that it was mentioned in that case in three separate opinions. Id. at 695 (Brennan,
J.); id. at 702 (White, J., concurring); id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring).
4. The test for determining whether a law restricting the sexual privacy rights
of teenagers is constitutional "is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling
state interest' test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults." Even
Justice Brennan so acknowledged. Id. at 693 n.15 (Brennan, J.).
5. There may be greater constitutional protection for the privacy of a pregnant
teen seeking an abortion than for an unpregnant teen seeking to use contracep-
tives. "The options available to the already pregnant minor are fundamentally
different from those available to nonpregnant minors." Id. at 713 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
6. Parental notice and consultation is much more likely to be upheld than broad
parental consent requirements. Some Belotti-type alternatives to parental con-
sent may be deemed necessary for the same practical reasons Justices Powell and
Stevens alluded to in Belloti.
215. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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as well as social-system level. Individually, it assumes regular, proper
use of contraceptives by minors, an assumption that is demonstrably
unrealistic.2 1 6 To the extent that availability of contraceptives encour-
ages the incidence of sexual activity by individual teenagers who are
not consistent in using contraceptives or who do not use them prop-
erly, thus increasing the likelihood for contraceptive failure, the provi-
sion of contraceptives may increase the risk of pregnancy by creating a
false sense of security. More importantly, however, even if the argu-
ment for reduced risk of pregnancy is valid for some individual teen-
agers, it ignores the group or sociological effect on teenagers as a
whole caused by promoting or providing contraceptives. Making con-
traceptive instruction or products available to all minors generally
conveys a message about social expectations and the parameters for
acceptable behavior. It also generates peer pressures to use them, at a
time that they are very susceptible to peer pressure, and that appears
to increase the incidence of sexual activity, pregnancy, and abortion by
teenagers.
The possibility that providing contraceptives to teenagers might ac-
tually lead to more, not fewer, teenage pregnancies has received sub-
stantial attention recently. The compelling statistical studies by Stan
Weed and Joseph Olsen have demonstrated, at least, that teen-di-
rected family planning programs have been ineffective in reducing
teenage pregnancy and abortion.217 Their data strongly suggest that
the provision of contraceptives to teenagers is directly and powerfully
associated with increases in both pregnancies and abortions among
teenagers.2 18
216. "Studies indicate that teenagers are poor contraceptors .... When teenagers do
use any method of birth control it is often sporadic and ineffectual." Averbach,
Nathan, O'Hae & Benedicto, Impact of Ethnicity, 23 SocIETY 35 (1985).
217. See Olsen & Weed, supra note 1; Weed & Olsen, Effects of Family-Planning Pro-
grams on Teenage Pregnancy-Replication and Extension, 20 FAM. PERSP. 173
(1986); Weed, supra note 1, at 36, col. 4. Access to family planning services in-
creased the incidence of teenage pregnancy, but modestly lowered the rate of
childbirth by significantly increasing the rate of teenage abortion. Id.
218. Olsen and Weed's initial analysis of 1978 birth and pregnancy rates showed that
rather than the family planners' predicted 200 to 300 fewer pregnancies for every
1,000 teenagers involved in family planning programs, there was an increase of
about 120 pregnancies for every 1,000 teenage family planning clients. Olsen &
Weed, supra note 1, at 160, 161. Instead of the predicted reduction of over 150
teenage abortions per 1,000 teenagers receiving family planning services, the
number of abortions increased by nearly that number. Weed, supra note 1, at 36,
col. 4. The number of births to teenagers did drop (apparently due to the increase
in abortions) about 30 fewer births per 1,000 teenage family planning clients. O1-
sen & Weed, supra note 1, at 160. The authors' replication study for 1980, and for
other time periods, confirmed the strong statistical associations between provi-
sion of family planning services to teenagers and increases in teen pregnancy and
abortion rates. Weed & Olsen, supra note 217, at 183, 184, 190. See Moore, Teen-
age Childbearing: Unresolved Issues in the Research/Policy Debate, 22 FAm.
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Even advocates of the confidential provision of contraceptives to
minors have acknowledged a potential problem. The authors of one
article in Family Planning Perspectives admitted that "prior exposure
to a sex education course is positively and significantly associated with
the initiation of sexual activity at ages fifteen and sixteen."2 19 These
authors also noted: "Adolescent women who have previously taken a
sex education course are somewhat more likely than those who have
not to initiate sexual activity at ages 15 and 16 (though they are no
more likely to do so at ages 17 and 18)."220 Even before the Weed and
Olsen studies were published, the authors of the highly publicized Na-
tional Research Council study, Risking the Future, acknowledged a
cause for concern and further investigation.221 Thus, the "nexus" be-
tween laudable social ends of preventing teen pregnancy 222 and the
means of providing general access by teens to contraceptive instruc-
tion and products is tenuous.
PERSP. 189, 192 (1988); Weed & Olsen, Policy and Program Considerations for
Teenage Pregnancy Prevention: A Summary for Policymaking, 22 FAM. PERSP.
235, 237-41 (1988).
219. Marsiglio & Mott, The Impact of Sex Education on Sexual Activity, Contraceptive
Use and Premarital Pregnancy Among American Teenagers, 18 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 151, 158 (1986). See also Singh, Adolescent Pregnancy in the United States,
18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 210, 216-18 (1986).
220. Marsiglio & Mott, supra note 219, at 158.
221. Critics of family planning programs suggest that the availability of con-
traceptive service has caused higher rates of sexual activity, unintended
pregnancy, abortion, and births to unmarried teenagers. Indeed the pe-
riod of significant increase in teenage sexual activity during the 1970s
was paralleled by significant growth of the availability of contraceptive
services for both adult women and adolescents. However, whether there
is a causal connection or whether both trends were responses to the
same changing social context and mores is unclear. Using data for Cali-
fornia, Kasun (1982) concluded that increased spending on contraceptive
services led to increased levels of sexual activity and, as a result, in-
creased pregnancies, abortions, and births outside marriage. However, as
Hofferth (Vol. II: ch. 9) points out, associations do not show causation,
and Kasun (1982) did not control for initial differences between Califor-
nia and the rest of the United States.
In contrast, Moore and Caldwell (1977) found no association between
the availability of family planning services and the probability that an
adolescent girl would initiate sexual intercourse, net of other factors
(age, socioeconomic status, family structure, urban/rural residence, re-
ligiousness, birth cohort). However, as Hoffereth (Vol. II: ch. 9) con-
cludes, more research is needed on this issue.
I NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISKING THE FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY,
PREGNANCY AND CHILD BEARING 166, 165 (1987). See also Dawson, supra note 3,
at 169 (could find correlation between sex education and sexual activity of teens
only for 14-year-olds in limited circumstances).
222. A majority of the Supreme Court has indicated that prevention of teenage preg-
nancy out of wedlock is of compelling state interest. Michael M. v. Sonoma
County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 470-73; id. at 490 (Brennan, J., Marshall, J.,
and White, J., dissenting); id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. A Constitutional Solution That Does Not Depend
Upon Privacy Analysis
The United States Constitution protects certain fundamental
rights that are not spelled out in detail in the text of the Constitution
or its amendments. A constitutional right of privacy protecting cer-
tain specific acts, decisions, and certain basic relationships and choices
has long been recognized, even though the term "privacy" and many
of those acts or relationships are not described specifically anywhere
in the text of the Constitution or its amendments.22 3 The privacy doc-
trine or some equivalent constitutional doctrine protecting "unwrit-
ten" fundamental rights unquestionably is necessary to maintain as
operative and viable today some principles or values which, in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were considered nonlegal but
necessary prerequisites for constitutional government. Because our
conception of "rights" has changed during the past two hundred years,
it is necessary today to transform those fundamental eighteenth-cen-
tury nonlegal principles into the language of twentieth-century consti-
tutional rights in order to preserve in full measure the constitutional
system that was established two centuries ago.
The greatest problem with the right of privacy as an operative con-
stitutional doctrine is that it means all things to all people.224 When
judges are asked to apply the unwritten, vaguely defined right of pri-
vacy to strike down state legislation concerning currently controver-
sial topics, a great risk of overreaching occurs-i.e., reading into the
Constitution the judges' own policy preferences in the name of identi-
fying and defending unwritten constitutional rights. Application of
the privacy doctrine entails the substantial risk that judges may go
beyond their constitutionally authorized judicial function of interpret-
ing the Constitution and get into the legislative function of establish-
ing public policy on contemporary controversial issues. For this
reason the Supreme Court, especially recently, has insisted on taking
a cautious, restricted approach to avoid extension of the privacy doc-
trine whenever possible.225
Judicial reluctance to resolve the controversy over the provision of
contraceptives to minors by application of the starkly individualistic
"privacy rights" analysis exists for a good reason.
223. See generally 3 PRIVAcY LAW AND PRACTICE chs. 19, 20 (G. Trubow ed. 1988).
224. "The right of privacy as a constitutional guarantee is at once ubiquitous and elu-
sive.... Although courts and commentators agree on the moral and legal princi-
ples on which the right is based, they disagree on its definition and application."
Id. at 19.01.
225. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(White, J., plurality opinion).
See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-501 (1977)(Powell, J.,
plurality opinion); id. at 537 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 542-47 (White, J., dis-
senting); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 167-70 (1973)(Stewart, J., concurring).
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We typically pay attention to the rights of individuals in order to stress
their moral independence.... In other words, the language of rights typically
helps us to sharpen our appreciation of the moral boundaries which separate
people....
Ideally the relationship between parent and infant involves an awareness
of a kind of union between people which is perhaps more suitably described in
poetic-spiritual language than in analytic moral terminology. We share our-
selves with those with whom we are intimate and are aware that they do the
same with us. Traditional moral boundaries, which give a rigid shape to the
self, are transparent to this kind of sharing.
The danger of talk about rights of children is that it may encourage people
to think that the proper relationship between themselves and their children is
the abstract one which the language of rights is forged to suit.
2 2 6
In other words, the risk of forcing a "privacy rights" analytical frame-
work upon disputes about a provision of contraceptives to adolescents
not only is that it may be like trying to force a square peg into a round
hole, but it may unintentionally and irreparably damage the value or
relationship it seeks to preserve.
Additionally, constitutionalizing the issue of parent-minor respon-
sibility in the provision of contraceptives to teenagers would erode the
long established principle that the regulation of family relations is "a
virtually exclusive province of the States."227 Constitutionalizing fam-
ily law would be unwarranted and unwise.228 Lacking any national
constitutional consensus on this controversial issue, it is best dealt
with at the state level.
Some people who are genuinely upset by one or another of the ju-
dicial decisions regarding whether parents must or may be involved
before contraceptive instruction, products, or services are provided to
unmarried minors have been drawn into a constitutional tug-of-war
regarding what the policy of the law should be. They see the contest
to be how the courts should interpret the Constitution to set public
policy on this important contemporary issue. However, they fail to
appreciate the more important preceding question-whether the
courts should be setting policy at all. Ironically, by overlooking the
question of which branch of government should set the policy and by
226. Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Fam-
ily, 91 ETHics 6, 8-9 (1980).
227. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975). See Thompson v. Thompson, 56 U.S.L.W.
4055 (1988); Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 383 (1930); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586,
593-94 (1890).
228. One of the more cogent arguments raised in opposition to the proposed (but
unadopted) Equal Rights Amendment was that it would constitutionalize family
law. See generally Elsen, Coogan & Ginsburg, Men, Women, and the Constitu-
tion " The Equal Rights Amendment, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROBS. 77, 80-81
(1973)(Fourteenth Annual Columbia Law Symposium); Ryman, A Comment on
Family Property Rights and the Proposed 27th Amendment, 22 DRAKE L. REv.
505, 514 (1973); Wardle, The Impact of the Proposed Equal Rights Amendment
Upon Family Law, 23 J. FAM. L. 477, 483-86 (1984).
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focusing instead on what they believe the policy should be-and argu-
ing for that policy to be judicially implemented as a constitutional
right-they have legitimated the very mistake of the judicial decisions
they find to be so objectionable. They fail to realize that the solution
to what they perceive to be bad judicial legislation is not more judicial
legislation.
However, a valid constitutional framework exists for resolving the
issue. The constitutional system of checks and balances allocates to
the politically accountable branches of government the responsibility
to establish public policy on such issues as the provision of contracep-
tives to minors. And the constitutional principle of federalism limits
the role of the federal government and gives priority to state policy
makers on matters concerning parent-child relations. The limited but
powerful role of federal courts to ascertain and protect constitutional
rights not expressly identified in the Constitution should not be mis-
appropriated to achieve a short-cut advantage in settling policy ques-
tions like this. Ultimately, the solution that the Constitution provides
for this controversy is structural, not substantive. It is self-govern-
ment; participatory democracy. That solution puts the burden on the
people to make the law be what they believe it should be by persuad-
ing their elected representatives to require or restrict parental notifi-
cation or by replacing them with persons who will do so. The
constitutional solution thus is political responsibility, not judicial
irresponsibility.
This is the approach taken by the Court of Appeals in Doe v. Ir-
win.2 9 Perhaps the most notable thing about the Sixth Circuit opin-
ion in Irwin is its subsequent history. Because it deals directly both
with an issue that has been very controversial and with a subject that
has been written upon so extensively and litigated rather frequently
in the nine years since the opinion was rendered, it is surprising to
find that the opinion has never been cited by another federal court.
Obviously, parties on both sides of the controversy-those who argue
for a constitutional right of minors to get contraceptives without pa-
rental participation as well as those who argue for a constitutional
right of parents to be notified of the provision of contraceptives to
their minor children-are dissatisfied with this Court of Appeals opin-
ion which says quite plainly that this is not a controversy for which
the Constitution necessarily mandates any particular resolution.
While this analysis clearly is not popular with advocates of expansive
parents' or minors' rights, it is the correct analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of parental notification of the provision of contraceptive
229. 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980).
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information and services to teenagers is of profound importance to our
country, its future, its families, and its teenagers. But the Constitution
does not provide the answers to all the important questions. Just be-
cause the issue is of compelling importance does not necessarily mean
that the Constitution compels any particular resolution of the contro-
versy. The fact that some resolutions would violate the Constitution
(for example, if contraceptives were provided by the state only to
black teenagers but not to white teenagers, or if the state mandated
the secret provision of contraceptive information, services, or products
to teenagers) does not mean that the Constitution mandates a specific
resolution to the policy issue. Parental involvement in the noncoer-
cive provision of contraceptive instruction, services, or products to mi-
nors is neither mandated nor prohibited by the Constitution.
It would be unwise and unwarranted to interpret the Constitution
as either mandating or prohibiting parental participation at this time.
Until the evidence of the effects, both intended and unintended, of the
current policy of not requiring parental notification of the provision of
contraceptives to minors is evaluated, 230 it would be foolish and pre-
mature to set public policy in constitutional cement. Moreover, until a
real constitutional consensus (i.e., sustained, super-majoritarian) for a
public policy for or against parental involvement notification is estab-
lished-that is, until the constitutional text is duly amended, or a
firmly established tradition clearly demonstrates genuine and perma-
nent constitutional consensus on the issue-it would be irresponsible
for courts to interpret the Constitution to dictate a particular public
policy on the matter.
230. See supra notes 218-21 and accompanying text.
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